A country in free fall
Jun. 23rd, 2012 05:18 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
nairiporterJust a month ago Egypt looked likely to make its first steps to democracy. The country got its parliament after open elections that had surprisingly proceeded without bloodshed. It was dominated by Islamists, but still it was elected on free elections and it started learning how to work properly. It even selected a commission for drafting a new Constitution. Public enemy number 1, Hosni Mubarak was sentenced to life prison, and the presidential election was promising an interesting battle between 5 strong candidates. The plan was that the military would hand the power over to the new head of state by July, whoever the new president would be. But within just a week, all of this has turned upside down.
First the representative of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohammed Mursi and the former prime minister under Mubarak, Ahmed Shafik reached the 2nd round of the presidential election. Many Egyptians saw in this a source for desperation, because they were left with no real choice. Either the Islamist or the establishment guy. Then this election suddenly lost its importance, because the supreme constitutional court declared the parliamentary vote unconstitutional and dissolved the new parliament. And the parliament had already appointed a Constitution commission which was to craft a new law of the land. And now the statute of this commission is unclear. The military hastened to intervene. First they assumed the prerogative to arrest civilians (effectively returning to a martial law situation), and then they introduced amendments in the draft Constitution, which would give them supreme legislative rights and would place them beyond the control of any future parliaments. It is exactly what many people had feared.
This is not just infuriating for the Egyptians, it is outright dangerous. And not just for Egypt. The country is a natural leader among the Arab countries, and what is happening in Cairo echoes everywhere in the region. The way Tahrir square became the symbol of the Arab spring, Egypt could produce a new, much more sinister model that would kill the little remaining momentum in the movements against dictatorships in the Middle East.
The direct target of these changes became the Islamists from the Muslim Brotherhood who were dominating that short-lived parliament and who were bound to win the presidential post as well. After a meeting with the military command, the speaker of parliament (who is from the MB) Saad al-Qahtani said that the actions of the military were illegal and the MPs would still conduct their first meeting in parliament. This almost lead Egypt to the brink of something ominous: the house of parliament was surrounded by tanks and it smelled of war. The darkest fears were soon dispersed though, because just 2 out of 500 MPs arrived for the meeting, and Qahtani himself didn't dare to attend. These two bold MPs tried to enter but the soldiers did not let them in, so this episode ended without bloodshed. The reaction from the MB was surprisingly restrained. Of course they sharpened their rhetoric against the military, but they didn't resort to other means of pressure that they surely have at their disposal. Although the constitutional court took its decision on Thursday, after the Friday prayer there was no protest at Tahrir. The upper house, the so called Shura hasn't been officially dissolved yet and it's the only directly elected ruling authority in the country at the moment. It's also dominated by the Islamists and their representative announced that it will also stop functioning.
But this is just the beginning of a much longer and very dangerous game. The Muslim Brotherhood are avoiding a direct clash with the military and are biding their time, waiting to see the next steps of the supreme command, to craft their further strategy. But time is not their ally. The inconsistent behavior of the parliament, the many unkept promises and the lack of a clear position towards the military are among the many reasons for the MB's decreasing popularity. Just half a year after the shocking 71% success on the parliamentary elections, the support for the Islamist party has shrunken rapidly. At the first round of the presidential election, their candidate won 5.8 million votes, which is half of the 10.1 million they won on the parliamentary elections. The more extreme Salafis are in a similar position as well. The situation is changing very rapidly.
This looks like a vicious cycle. The Muslim Brotherhood is in a difficult situation, because it is losing support, and its legitimacy along with it. This is pressing them and forcing them to be more prone to strike a deal for sharing power with the military. Speculations about such a scenario have been present since the very start of the revolution, but now it seems more likely than ever.
There could be another explanation for this crisis in the MB. For almost a century they have been in opposition. They could be lacking knowledge and expertise about the way modern politics should be conducted from the position of a ruler. And the military have a vast advantage in this respect.
On the other hand, talking of a well planned military coup is not very plausible. First, the military have never relinquished power completely after Mubarak's fall anyway, and they successfully avoided doing that now, again. Secondly, as the other players are growing weaker, the military council will find it easier to pass their agenda. The situation is developing favourably for them. Although the military seems to be in the driving seat during much of the transition, they have hardly had the time and expertise to tinker with every single detail of the process, as some conspiracy theorists believe. All they are doing is reacting pragmatically to the events and gaining advantage from the lack of political leadership among the opposition forces. Although it may sound surprising, the military is still seen as a saviour and protector of the nation by many people in Egypt who haven't forgotten its role in the events at Tahrir. So it is reasonable to expect that the army is perceived as this neutral factor outside and above the law, without a particular strategy or plan, and whose only goal is to keep its influence in key areas of the social and political life of the country. Without necessarily ruling directly. But meanwhile, those who had expected a Western type of democracy in Egypt, are feeling betrayed now. And discontent is building up.
For example, with one of the adopted amendments, the military have given themselves the right to veto texts in the future Constitution, however it may look like. What's more, if a Constitution is not proposed in the next 3 months, the military command has the chance to appoint its own constitutional council that would draft one. So it is far more beneficial for the generals to have new elections - they have nothing to lose, even in case the next parliament is dominated by forces that are hostile to them.
This role of the protector of the nation is starting to resemble the Turkish military before Erdogan came to power. It is no secret that the Turkish model is being seen as a viable alternative to Mubarak's model in Egypt. The Turkish military is seen as a guarantor for the secular character of the state and they do not shy away from interfering directly - they have made three military coups in Turkey's modern history, always stepping in against governments that were dangerously dominated by Islamists. There are also similarities to the role of the military in Pakistan, where they also control the state to a point where its secular character is sacrosanct, and often protected at the point of a gun. In the meantime they have a record of successful partnership with various Islamic extremists, including the Taliban, whenever that suits their purposes. Something that is hard to comprehend in the West. It is no coincidence that the Constitutional declaration in Egypt (drafted by the military council) starts with the words "In the name of God, the all-merciful", but beyond mere words, it is doubtful that any meaning is being given to that introduction.
But meanwhile, one of the texts in the draft Constitution that was met with a severe resistance from the military, was the one about disclosing the military budget that has been kept in secret for the last decades. Still, it is no secret that a large part of the 1.3 billion dollar annual subsidy from the US goes to the military, and they have their own enormous economic structures permeating the Egyptian society - just like the military in Turkey and Iran.
So where are things headed now? In this complex political game the biggest loser of course are the Egyptian people themselves. The political farce that has allowed the military to keep control, tacitly approved by the Islamists, could do its job, but it could also set the fragile Egyptian peace ablaze as well. The election commission that postponed the announcement of the results from the presidential election, is additionally building up the tension. Thousands are planning to gather on Tahrir square again, and still more are prepared to take to the streets when the results come out.
But while the streets are boiling, the coveted transition to a better political system is drifting away with every passing day, and only a bunch of confused actors with no clear script remain standing on the scene. The Egyptian economy is wandering in the wild and preparing for a state of free-fall, workers' strikes continue to shake entire regions in the province, and not one president or prime minister would be able to solve these problems, even if they rolled up the sleeves tomorrow. And this "tomorrow" is being postponed again and again.
Of course we shouldn't dismiss all that has been accomplished by the Egyptian revolution over the last 15 months. Granted, the revolution is a process, not an event. And no one could say for certain when it would end, if ever. But the changes that have occurred since the Tahrir events have transformed the political system - free elections, an open political competition, and speaking openly about all the probems. This would never have happened under Mubarak, so it is a good start. In this sense, the revolution has been a success, if only partial. It started processes that cannot be reversed. When it will achieve its ultimate goals, remains unclear - if ever. The risks are great and many. Right now the Egyptian revolution resembles Hosni Mubarak's health condition - it is simultaneously declared both dead and alive, fighting for its life... But as is in Mubarak's case, jumping to either diagnosis would be too premature.
First the representative of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohammed Mursi and the former prime minister under Mubarak, Ahmed Shafik reached the 2nd round of the presidential election. Many Egyptians saw in this a source for desperation, because they were left with no real choice. Either the Islamist or the establishment guy. Then this election suddenly lost its importance, because the supreme constitutional court declared the parliamentary vote unconstitutional and dissolved the new parliament. And the parliament had already appointed a Constitution commission which was to craft a new law of the land. And now the statute of this commission is unclear. The military hastened to intervene. First they assumed the prerogative to arrest civilians (effectively returning to a martial law situation), and then they introduced amendments in the draft Constitution, which would give them supreme legislative rights and would place them beyond the control of any future parliaments. It is exactly what many people had feared.
This is not just infuriating for the Egyptians, it is outright dangerous. And not just for Egypt. The country is a natural leader among the Arab countries, and what is happening in Cairo echoes everywhere in the region. The way Tahrir square became the symbol of the Arab spring, Egypt could produce a new, much more sinister model that would kill the little remaining momentum in the movements against dictatorships in the Middle East.
The direct target of these changes became the Islamists from the Muslim Brotherhood who were dominating that short-lived parliament and who were bound to win the presidential post as well. After a meeting with the military command, the speaker of parliament (who is from the MB) Saad al-Qahtani said that the actions of the military were illegal and the MPs would still conduct their first meeting in parliament. This almost lead Egypt to the brink of something ominous: the house of parliament was surrounded by tanks and it smelled of war. The darkest fears were soon dispersed though, because just 2 out of 500 MPs arrived for the meeting, and Qahtani himself didn't dare to attend. These two bold MPs tried to enter but the soldiers did not let them in, so this episode ended without bloodshed. The reaction from the MB was surprisingly restrained. Of course they sharpened their rhetoric against the military, but they didn't resort to other means of pressure that they surely have at their disposal. Although the constitutional court took its decision on Thursday, after the Friday prayer there was no protest at Tahrir. The upper house, the so called Shura hasn't been officially dissolved yet and it's the only directly elected ruling authority in the country at the moment. It's also dominated by the Islamists and their representative announced that it will also stop functioning.
But this is just the beginning of a much longer and very dangerous game. The Muslim Brotherhood are avoiding a direct clash with the military and are biding their time, waiting to see the next steps of the supreme command, to craft their further strategy. But time is not their ally. The inconsistent behavior of the parliament, the many unkept promises and the lack of a clear position towards the military are among the many reasons for the MB's decreasing popularity. Just half a year after the shocking 71% success on the parliamentary elections, the support for the Islamist party has shrunken rapidly. At the first round of the presidential election, their candidate won 5.8 million votes, which is half of the 10.1 million they won on the parliamentary elections. The more extreme Salafis are in a similar position as well. The situation is changing very rapidly.
This looks like a vicious cycle. The Muslim Brotherhood is in a difficult situation, because it is losing support, and its legitimacy along with it. This is pressing them and forcing them to be more prone to strike a deal for sharing power with the military. Speculations about such a scenario have been present since the very start of the revolution, but now it seems more likely than ever.
There could be another explanation for this crisis in the MB. For almost a century they have been in opposition. They could be lacking knowledge and expertise about the way modern politics should be conducted from the position of a ruler. And the military have a vast advantage in this respect.
On the other hand, talking of a well planned military coup is not very plausible. First, the military have never relinquished power completely after Mubarak's fall anyway, and they successfully avoided doing that now, again. Secondly, as the other players are growing weaker, the military council will find it easier to pass their agenda. The situation is developing favourably for them. Although the military seems to be in the driving seat during much of the transition, they have hardly had the time and expertise to tinker with every single detail of the process, as some conspiracy theorists believe. All they are doing is reacting pragmatically to the events and gaining advantage from the lack of political leadership among the opposition forces. Although it may sound surprising, the military is still seen as a saviour and protector of the nation by many people in Egypt who haven't forgotten its role in the events at Tahrir. So it is reasonable to expect that the army is perceived as this neutral factor outside and above the law, without a particular strategy or plan, and whose only goal is to keep its influence in key areas of the social and political life of the country. Without necessarily ruling directly. But meanwhile, those who had expected a Western type of democracy in Egypt, are feeling betrayed now. And discontent is building up.
For example, with one of the adopted amendments, the military have given themselves the right to veto texts in the future Constitution, however it may look like. What's more, if a Constitution is not proposed in the next 3 months, the military command has the chance to appoint its own constitutional council that would draft one. So it is far more beneficial for the generals to have new elections - they have nothing to lose, even in case the next parliament is dominated by forces that are hostile to them.
This role of the protector of the nation is starting to resemble the Turkish military before Erdogan came to power. It is no secret that the Turkish model is being seen as a viable alternative to Mubarak's model in Egypt. The Turkish military is seen as a guarantor for the secular character of the state and they do not shy away from interfering directly - they have made three military coups in Turkey's modern history, always stepping in against governments that were dangerously dominated by Islamists. There are also similarities to the role of the military in Pakistan, where they also control the state to a point where its secular character is sacrosanct, and often protected at the point of a gun. In the meantime they have a record of successful partnership with various Islamic extremists, including the Taliban, whenever that suits their purposes. Something that is hard to comprehend in the West. It is no coincidence that the Constitutional declaration in Egypt (drafted by the military council) starts with the words "In the name of God, the all-merciful", but beyond mere words, it is doubtful that any meaning is being given to that introduction.
But meanwhile, one of the texts in the draft Constitution that was met with a severe resistance from the military, was the one about disclosing the military budget that has been kept in secret for the last decades. Still, it is no secret that a large part of the 1.3 billion dollar annual subsidy from the US goes to the military, and they have their own enormous economic structures permeating the Egyptian society - just like the military in Turkey and Iran.
So where are things headed now? In this complex political game the biggest loser of course are the Egyptian people themselves. The political farce that has allowed the military to keep control, tacitly approved by the Islamists, could do its job, but it could also set the fragile Egyptian peace ablaze as well. The election commission that postponed the announcement of the results from the presidential election, is additionally building up the tension. Thousands are planning to gather on Tahrir square again, and still more are prepared to take to the streets when the results come out.
But while the streets are boiling, the coveted transition to a better political system is drifting away with every passing day, and only a bunch of confused actors with no clear script remain standing on the scene. The Egyptian economy is wandering in the wild and preparing for a state of free-fall, workers' strikes continue to shake entire regions in the province, and not one president or prime minister would be able to solve these problems, even if they rolled up the sleeves tomorrow. And this "tomorrow" is being postponed again and again.
Of course we shouldn't dismiss all that has been accomplished by the Egyptian revolution over the last 15 months. Granted, the revolution is a process, not an event. And no one could say for certain when it would end, if ever. But the changes that have occurred since the Tahrir events have transformed the political system - free elections, an open political competition, and speaking openly about all the probems. This would never have happened under Mubarak, so it is a good start. In this sense, the revolution has been a success, if only partial. It started processes that cannot be reversed. When it will achieve its ultimate goals, remains unclear - if ever. The risks are great and many. Right now the Egyptian revolution resembles Hosni Mubarak's health condition - it is simultaneously declared both dead and alive, fighting for its life... But as is in Mubarak's case, jumping to either diagnosis would be too premature.
